UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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5 January 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report, which was addressed to me on 4 January 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 943 (1994).

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994. In that resolution, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

2. It will be recalled that, on 4 August 1994, the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the Republika Srpska";

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the Republika Srpska (Parliament, Presidency and Government), in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia";

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the Republika Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine."

3. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372). The report dated 5 December 1994 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

> "In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. Bo Pellnås, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces".

Developments in the past 30 days are dealt with below.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

4. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border with the Bosnian Serbs continues in force. It should be noted that the legislation adopted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only closed the border "for all transport towards the Republika Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine". This point has been made in each of the four preceding reports submitted by the Co-Chairmen to the Security Council (S/1994/1074, para. 5; S/1994/1124, para. 1; S/1994/1246, para. 2; S/1994/1372, para. 2). The terms of reference of the Mission were reproduced in the report of 19 September 1994 (S/1994/1074, para. 15), where it is expressly stated that "the responsibility of controlling the crossings remain with" the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and that members of the Mission "will work alongside customs officers to look into any vehicles crossing; and ... have examined any items conveyed by individuals or vehicles across the border which they suspect might not be classified as purely humanitarian".

5. Keeping in mind the government legislation and the above-mentioned terms of reference, the Mission has concentrated on transport towards the "Republika Srpska", while paying attention to transit traffic. As was stated in the report of 3 October 1994 (S/1994/1124, para. 3), "as far as transit traffic to the Republic of Croatia is concerned, agreements have been made covering customs documentation and the sealing of load-carrying vehicles to reduce the obvious risk of a diversion of supplies to the Bosnian Serbs". This is further elaborated upon in the report of 2 November (S/1994/1246, para. 26), the relevant parts of which were as follows:

> "The procedures for traffic transiting the territory held by the Bosnian Serbs into the territory held by Serbs in Croatia have now been firmly established. Transports are divided into two categories, one consisting of humanitarian aid ... and the second being fuel .... The second category, fuel, is transported on 52 specially designated trucks, all provided with tachometers. Normally, convoys of some 20 trucks, escorted by police, transit into Croatia. The tachometers are sealed by the Mission when trucks leave Belgrade two or three times a week, and are removed by the Mission when the trucks return to the starting-point. The first sets of print-outs from the tachometers were sent to the United Kingdom on 1 November for analysis."

Analysis has shown that all the vehicles concerned kept to their authorized route. Nevertheless, the only check against them offloading oil at rest points was the accompanying police.

6. Some comments have been made about the relevance of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), and specifically paragraph 12 thereof, to the activities of the Mission. On this point, the Co-Chairmen have based themselves on the following interpretation provided by their legal adviser:

> "Paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) empowers the Government of the Republic of Croatia to control authorizations for imports to, exports from and transshipments through the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in

the Republic of Croatia only for the purpose of ensuring that no goods prohibited in respect of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by that resolution or by resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) are imported to, exported from or transshipped through those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces without proper authorization from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

7. Apart from the legal aspects of this matter, there is also a political aspect of vital importance. The closure by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the border towards the Republika Srpska had the objective of persuading the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. That objective would surely have been defeated had the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) simultaneously pursued policies that could have thrown the Croatian Serbs into the arms of the Bosnian Serbs. It was precisely for these reasons that the Co-Chairman intensified efforts for the conclusion of an economic agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities which could enable the UNPAs to be supplied with oil from within the Republic of Croatia. In section IV of the agreement signed on 2 December 1994 by the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities (see S/1994/1375, appendix I), it is provided that:

"A joint commercial company will be established as soon as possible to sell and distribute oil and oil products at market prices in the UNPAs. The pipeline through UNPA North will be opened as soon as this company is established and the Joint Commission has declared that the pipeline is operational. The other segment of the pipeline will be opened when circumstances permit."

8. With the establishment of a joint commercial oil company, the issue of oil transiting into the UNPAs will no longer arise. The Co-Chairmen shuttled between Zagreb and Belgrade between 15 and 18 December in an attempt to reach agreement on the oil company and the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway. On Sunday, 18 December, in Belgrade, it appeared to the Co-Chairmen that the opening of the highway was again to be delayed. They therefore instructed the Coordinator of the Mission to stop all oil-transiting into the UNPAs. On Wednesday, 21 December, the highway was opened and the Co-Chairmen instructed that electricity supply materials necessary for the implementation of that part of the agreement relating to electricity and water should transit to Knin. On 23 December there were further negotiations in Belgrade over a joint commercial oil company. On 29 December, when the highway through the western UNPA was certified by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to be fully opened, the Co-Chairmen instructed that, following the previously agreed procedures (see para. 5 above), oil should be supplied only to the western UNPA. Since this supply was clearly linked to implementation of the 2 December agreement, UNPROFOR agreed to check the oil-carrying vehicles on entering and leaving the western UNPA. The Co-Chairmen also informed the Croatian Government on 2 January 1995 that the generating poles in Zagreb should be sent to the Obrovac power station. The Co-Chairmen continued negotiating on the joint commercial oil company in Knin, Zagreb and Belgrade between 2 and 4 January and will keep the Security Council informed on progress (see appendix).

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

9. As at 3 January 1995, 178 international Mission personnel were on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland and the United States of America.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

10. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The security situation for the Mission members did not cause concern as December ended. The Sector Commander, Sector Belgrade, did, however, receive a threatening call in December. The Mission Coordinator gave all information to the authorities and they took swift and forceful action.

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

11. In the assessment of the Mission Coordinator, the cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be very satisfactory.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

12. The operating principle of the Mission is to base itself on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate. The Coordinator has received some such information on which follow-up measures have been taken.

13. The information received has basically been of two kinds: that which describe events in terms so general that make it totally impossible to find out where and when the event allegedly took place, and detailed information stating both place and time. Almost all detailed information up until now has proved to be inaccurate since the Mission has had teams on a 24-hour basis on the crossings where incidents are said to have occurred. In some cases, violations allegedly took place before the Mission had members on a 24-hour basis at the actual spots. When it has thus been possible to check information received, it has turned out that it is mostly unfounded and this raises serious questions about the accuracy of the general kind of information.

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

14. The Mission now covers 20 major crossings 24 hours a day. Some minor crossings are being sealed during night time, in a way that makes it virtually impossible to use them. The Mission now encounters very few substantial problems along the border. Its members, in many cases, are very tired because of the long period of hard work under often harsh conditions, but continue to carry out their tasks with keenness and high morale. The coverage of the border is now such that there is a good picture of what is going on. The Mission Coordinator finds the situation most satisfactory and reported that his latest proposals to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities have been fully accepted and forceful action was being taken by them, including by the military. The Mission Coordinator personally inspected border crossings over the three-day period, from 18 to 20 December 1994.

15. In the last report it was stated that sufficient measures to meet the Mission's demands had not yet been taken by the military authorities. At a meeting on 8 December with the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Kovacevic, the Mission Coordinator, was informed about actions taken by the Yugoslav Army. General Kovacevic claimed that the border battalions had been reinforced; the rules for division of responsibilities between the police, customs and the military had been clarified; and the cooperation between them reinforced. The Mission teams along the border confirmed a noticeable increase in military presence along the border as well as improved cooperation with the Mission.

16. On Friday, 16 December, the Mission Coordinator had a meeting with General Babic, Commander of the Second Yugoslav Army, and Admiral Zec, Commander Herceg Novi Military District. During this meeting, General Babic presented a map that indicated that 20 minor border crossings inside military border areas were to be permanently blocked. General Babic stated that the work was already being carried out. It was agreed that the Mission could seal a barrier that was to be erected across the road in the so-called Nudo valley. Observations on the ground and talks between the Mission's Special Envoy in Podgorica and the Chef de Cabinet of President Bulatovic revealed that the barricades were not constructed as promised by General Babic. They could still be removed fairly quickly and were, as a matter of fact, not completely blocking the roads. At a further meeting with General Babic in Podgorica on 20 December, the Mission Coordinator raised this issue, and he once again assured the Mission Coordinator that all 20 crossings were to be thoroughly and permanently blocked. At 1900 hours on 21 December, the Mission Coordinator received reports that confirmed that all crossings in Sector Charlie had been effectively blocked. In fact the number of such physical barriers erected from where the border leaves the Drina river down to Herceg Novi is 32. The physical blocking of bypass roads and minor dirt-track roads has had a good effect. With only one exception, every reported effort by smugglers to bypass police or military checkpoints has failed. In the view of the Mission Coordinator, this was a major achievement since it literally made it impossible to take any cars or trucks across the Montenegrin border to Bosnia and Herzegovina except at seven checkpoints where Mission, customs and police personnel are present on a 24-hour

basis. Any substantial support from the Yugoslav Army to the Bosnian Serbs across the Montenegrin border was thus made impossible.

17. The reports from the Mission members, as well as the observations of the Mission Coordinator, verify an intensified presence of the Yugoslav Army also along the Drina. The Mission Coordinator has been informed that 30 percent of the border troops along the borders with Hungary and Romania have been transferred to the Bosnian border, together with their equipment, such as cars and radios. The Mission Coordinator also understands that 1,500 additional security personnel have been hired in order to shut down smuggling operations aggressively in towns and cities and prevent goods from reaching the border. During the week from 17 to 24 December, according to government sources, not less than 30 tons of fuel were confiscated. In the view of the Mission Coordinator, the control of the Drina is effective and as a result the amount of confiscated fuel is reported to be substantial.

18. On 18 December, Mission members detected a smuggling operation across the bridge at Mali Zvornik, with cars passing the border repeatedly, after being filled up at a garage some 100 metres away from the crossing. Neither the police nor the customs took action in spite of demands from the Mission members. The Mission Coordinator brought this to the attention of the authorities in Belgrade and demanded action. In response, the authorities have closed down this operation, made arrests and banned the several vehicles involved from making any further crossings into Bosnia and Herzegovina while the border sanctions are in effect. The Mission Coordinator's demand was given a positive response and sufficient action now seems to be taken.

19. On some occasions, however, military patrols from the Yugoslav Army had been neglecting to take action against smugglers they have come across. The Mission Coordinator has asked the authorities to correct this shortcoming immediately.

20. At a meeting with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Director of Customs, Mr. Kertes, on 13 December, he informed the Mission Coordinator that a special command with special teams under his direct authority had been organized. These teams were tasked to patrol the entire border, controlling not only the border itself, but also all police, customs and military personnel working along the border. Their first efforts were concentrated on Montenegro.

21. The Mission Coordinator reported that it was obvious that the customs authorities were trying hard to improve customs procedures. While there may still have been some shortcomings among individuals, the overall picture was satisfactory. The customs work had been especially good at Sremska Raca, Badovinci and in Belgrade. Nevertheless, during the week of 12 to 18 December, at a point some 18 kilometres south-east of Bratunac, a Mission foot patrol found four large pontoon boats in an area where the teams earlier had been advised not to go for "security reasons". There were no signs that the boats had been used. Two Bosnian Serb soldiers, however, were observed on the other side of the Drina. The Mission Coordinator demanded that the boats be taken away.

22. In the opinion of the Mission Coordinator, customs procedures otherwise have improved lately by stricter control of buses passing the border. Although buses have been a concern to the Mission, so far the controls carried out have revealed only one attempt to smuggle fuel in extra tanks. The situation in Montenegro continues to be satisfactory with Mission personnel present 24 hours a day at all major crossings and with good cooperation from the authorities. The Mission members working with the trains passing through Bosnia and Herzegovina are satisfied with the cooperation given to them by the railway authorities. The sealing of trains in Uscice and in Priboj continues without any problems.

23. On the night of 31 December 1994 to 1 January 1995, 16 fuel tankers and 7 other trucks were seized by the military in the Nudo valley, south of the Vilusi border crossing. This large-scale attempted smuggling operation seems to have been a calculated attempt to take advantage of an anticipated festive atmosphere at border crossings on New Year's Eve. It started by a bulldozer coming up to the 3-metre-high barrier from the Bosnian side. It was turned back by the military and did so without protests. After this the trucks started to come into the valley. The warrant officer in charge of the area called for reinforcements and positions were taken up by the military to prevent any efforts to free drivers and trucks. As at 3 January, the trucks had not yet been extricated from the valley, which would require drivers to reverse for 2 kilometres uphill on a very narrow mountain road, running on a shelf between the mountain side and a steep slope.

24. At the border crossing at Metaljka, trucks with coal, said to be humanitarian aid, started to cross the border on 16 December, despite protests from Mission personnel on the ground and also from the Sector headquarters. The Mission Coordinator made representations to the authorities and has reason to believe that this traffic has now been effectively stopped.

25. On the night of 26/27 December, 14 buses passed from Bosnia and Herzegovina into Serbia at Sremska Raca, carrying soldiers. In the darkness, it was not possible for the Mission personnel to see what sort of army badges - if any - were worn. Information received by the Mission Coordinator from reliable sources indicates that the soldiers were Croatian Serbs from UNPA Sector East returning after their tour of duty in UNPA Sector South. While transit into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) does not come within the mandate of the Mission, the Mission Coordinator has written to the authorities in Belgrade informing them that any attempt to take soldiers back across the border would be a violation.

26. Lack of resources has been a major cause of concern. Insufficient four-wheel-drive cars, low standards of accommodation, long-lasting power cuts, difficult road communications between headquarters and teams on the ground and an inability to purchase generators for caravans has made life very hard for many members of the Mission. If the Security Council decides to continue with the Mission, then the Co-Chairmen will have to make expenditures for improving facilities. They wish to put on record their thanks for the dedication and unstinting efforts put in by all members of the Mission and in particular its Coordinator, Bo Pellnäs, who has asked to retire and will be replaced by Mr. Tauno Juhani Nieminen of Finland on 15 January 1995.

27. With the new barriers in place in Montenegro and the increased surveillance and enforcement along the Drina, the Mission Coordinator believes that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are meeting their commitment to close the border effectively. While some small-scale smuggling may be possible, the above measures have made it highly unlikely that any cars or trucks could cross the border, except at those places where the Mission maintains a 24-hour presence. It may still be possible for the local population to take small boats across the Drina at night, although the risk of being detected has increased substantially. The possibilities of bringing fuel or other goods down to the river most probably have anyhow ceased to exist. The authorities have made major efforts to meet our demands and the Mission Coordinator now finds the situation most satisfactory. The Mission Coordinator has emphasized that no information or reports about fuel passing the border in Montenegro have been received during the last five weeks.

28. The roads in part of the Mission area are now becoming increasingly dangerous. At places it will from time to time not be possible to pass through. Hard surface ice on the asphalt on steep slopes where the road turns sharply without fences has, unfortunately, caused accidents involving Mission personnel already, but with minor injuries only. The Mission Coordinator has authorized Sector leaders to stop teams going to some border crossings when they judge weather conditions to be too dangerous. The Mission Coordinator reported on 31 December:

> "I am very satisfied with the efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities during the last month. The most significant of those being the physical barriers on bypasses and small dirt track roads between the Drina and the Adriatic at 32 places. Those barriers, together with the already fallen snow, will make it very difficult to pass the border with any kind of vehicle, except on the official border crossings where the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has a 24-hour presence.
>
> "The reinforced surveillance of the Drina by the military border battalions is also efficient. The constant patrolling of the border by special combined teams (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) customs, police, military) has also improved the work of the 'normal' border teams at the official crossings. It is therefore my conclusion that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities are meeting their commitment to close the border effectively."

VIII. CERTIFICATION

29. In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. Bo Pellnås, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces.

Appendix

Timetable for the implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994

The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have agreed with Mr. Sarinic and Mr. Mikelic on the following implementation timetable for the agreement signed on 2 December 1994.

1. The Zagreb-Lipovac highway, which opened for daytime travel on 21 December 1994 will, as from Friday, 6 January 1995, 6.a.m., be permanently opened on a 24-hour basis.

2. From Thursday, 5 January 1995, the generator poles shall be tested at the Koncar factory in Zagreb in the presence of international experts to verify that they are in working order, and will be transported by road to the Obrovac power plant on Monday, 9 January.

3. Repair work on all damaged electricity and water facilities will proceed as quickly as possible according to a timetable to be agreed and monitored by the Joint Commission, the first phase of which should be operational by 24 February 1995.

4. Legal and commercial experts will conduct further negotiations on the statutes for a joint commercial oil company with a view to reaching early agreement.

5. UNPROFOR experts accompanied by two experts from Croatian Railways and two experts from the local authorities will immediately inspect the Zagreb-Okucani-Brod-Mirkovci railway line and report by Tuesday, 10 January 1995, on the schedule for the urgent repair of the line. The repair work will be conducted under UNPROFOR supervision and will draw on equipment and expertise that will be made available at no charge from Croatian Railways and the local authorities.

6. The same technical procedure as above will be followed with a view to drawing up a schedule for the opening of Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and the report will be made available as soon as possible.

7. The oil pipeline through UNPA Sector North will be inspected by UNPROFOR experts as soon as weather conditions permit, the problem being that demining is hazardous when snow is on the ground.

8. On 5 January 1995, the Joint Commission will meet in Split, chaired by Ambassador Eide and the United Nations Head of Civil Affairs, Mr. Moussali, on behalf of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee. This meeting will deal with all aspects of implementation of the agreement signed on 2 December 1994.

9. On Wednesday, 11 January 1995, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia will meet at the

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United Nations headquarters at Pleso Camp with Mr. Sarinic and Mr. Mikelic to continue negotiations.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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5 January 1995

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LETTER DATED 5 JANUARY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith, the texts of two documents:

(a) An acceptance and accession agreement (see annex I);

(b) An agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo agreement (S/1994/1174, annex) (see annex II);

both made and entered into at Accra on Wednesday, 21 December 1994, by the warring factions in the Liberian conflict, represented respectively by Mr. François Massaquoi, Lofa Defense Force (LDF); Mr. G. E. Saigbe Boley, Sr., Liberian Peace Council (LPC); Mr. J. Thomas Woewiyu, Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL); Maj. Gen. Roosevelt Johnson, United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO); and Counsellor J. D. Bayogar Junius, Liberia National Conference (LNC); and by Mr. Charles G. Taylor, Leader, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); Lt.-Gen. Alhaji G. V. Kromah, National Chairman, (ULIMO); and Lt.-Gen. J. Hezekiah Bowen, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The Agreements were attested to by H. E. Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, President of the Republic of Ghana and current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States.

It would be appreciated if you could circulate the present letter and the agreements as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George O. LAMPTEY
Permanent Representative

95-00365 (E) 060195 070195

Annex I

Acceptance and Accession Agreement

This acceptance and accession undertaking made and entered into this twenty-first day of December AD 1994 by the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), represented by Mr. François Massaquoi; the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), represented by Mr. G. E. Saigbe Boley, Sr.; the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), represented by J. Thomas Woewiyu; the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), represented by Major General Roosevelt Johnson; the Liberia National Conference (LNC), represented by Counsellor J. D. Bayogar Junius, all of whom are hereinafter collectively referred to as the non-signatories to the Akosombo agreement, hereby:

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, an agreement, referred to as the "Akosombo agreement", was made and entered into on the twelfth day of September, by and between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and ULIMO, in an effort to establish a cease-fire, facilitate disarmament, encampment and demobilization, and pave the way for a free and fair election; and

WHEREAS, the non-signatories to the Akosombo agreement did not participate in the discussions leading to the Akosombo agreement; and

WHEREAS, a need arose for further discussions between the signatories to the Akosombo agreement for clarification and expansion of the provisions therein with a view to facilitating the acceptance and the implementation of the agreement, in which said discussions the non-signatories fully participated; and

WHEREAS, after intense discussions and negotiations between the parties to the Akosombo agreement and the non-signatories thereto, the non-signatories have agreed to accept the terms and conditions of the Akosombo agreement with the clarifications thereto as set forth and contained in the agreement on the clarification of the said Akosombo agreement;

NOW, THEREFORE, the non-signatories to the Akosombo agreement, in consideration of their participation in the discussions on the clarification of the Akosombo agreement, and in further consideration of the political arrangements agreed upon and accepted by them, agree as follows, to wit:

1. That the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), in their individual capacities; the LNC, and ULIMO agree to accept and to accede to, and by this document hereby accept and accede to the Akosombo agreement and the agreement on clarification of the aforesaid Akosombo agreement.

2. That the non-signatories commit themselves individually and collectively to the terms and conditions of the Akosombo agreement and the agreement on clarification of the said agreement, and undertake fully to implement and

discharge all the tasks and the responsibilities, and to abide by all the terms and conditions as set forth and contained under the said Akosombo agreement, and the agreement on clarification of the said Akosombo agreement, as if they were signatories thereto and/or specifically named therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE PARTIES HERETO have hereunto set their hands and affixed their signatures this twenty-first day of December AD 1994 in the City of Accra, Republic of Ghana:

ULIMO
(Signed) Roosevelt JOHNSON
Represented by and through its Chairman
Major General Roosevelt JOHNSON

Lofa Defense Force (LDF)
(Signed) François MASSAQUOI
Represented by and through its Leader,
François MASSAQUOI

Liberian Peace Council (LPC)
(Signed) G. E. SAIGBE BOLEY, SR.
Represented by and through its
Chairman, Mr. G. E. SAIGBE BOLEY, SR.

The Central Revolutionary Council
(CRC-NPFL)
(Signed) Jucontee Thomas WOEWIYU
Represented by and through its
Chairman, Jucontee Thomas WOEWIYU

Liberia National Conference (LNC)
(Signed) J. D. Bayogar JUNIUS
Represented by and through its Chairman
Counsellor J. D. Bayogar JUNIUS

Attested to:

(Signed) Jerry John RAWLINGS
H.E. Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings
President of the Republic of Ghana
and Current Chairman of ECOWAS

Annex II

Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement

This agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement made this twenty-first day of December AD 1994 is intended to clarify and expand pertinent provisions of the said Akosombo agreement.

SECTION A

Article 1

CEASE-FIRE

The Parties to this agreement hereby declare a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities effective as of 2359 hours on the twenty-eighth day of December 1994.

SECTION C

Article 4

TERMS AND CONDITIONS (SAFE HAVENS AND BUFFER ZONES)

Consistent with section C, article 4, count 5, of the Akosombo agreement, the parties agree to facilitate the establishment of safe havens and buffer zones throughout Liberia in accordance with a plan to be drawn up by the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in collaboration with the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in consultation with the parties. In this connection, the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the establishment of buffer zones, safe havens and other measures necessary to restore normalcy throughout the territory of Liberia, shall be undertaken in accordance with the Cotonou and Akosombo agreements.

In keeping with section C, article 4, count 6, LNTG shall enter into a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS within seven (7) days as of the seating of the Council of State established under this agreement.

SECTION H

Article 9

DEMOBILIZATION

Consistent with section H, article 9, count 4, of the Akosombo agreement it is agreed by the parties that in the reorganization of the Armed Forces of

Liberia, the police, immigration and other security agencies, the combatants and non-combatants who satisfy conditions for recruitment shall be considered for inclusion. In this connection, the Council of State established under the Akosombo agreement clarified by this agreement shall establish appropriate committees which will be charged with determining the criteria for recruitment, taking advantage of the relevant expertise of ECOMOG and UNOMIL.

SECTION K

Article 12

SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION

The parties hereby agree to abide by the schedule of implementation attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Part II

Political issues

SECTION A

(EXECUTIVE)

Consistent with part II, section A (i), of the Akosombo agreement, the provisions for the function and structure of the five-member Council of State provided for in the Cotoncu and Akosombo agreements are hereby reconfirmed.

The procedure for the appointment of the relevant officials of Government as enshrined in the Akosombo agreement is hereby reaffirmed. Such officials shall be appointed based on merit.

The parties agree that a five-member Council of State shall be established.

The first four members of the new Council of State shall be appointed as follows:

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 1

United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) 1

Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)/Coalition 1

Liberia National Conference (LNC) 1

The fifth member of the Council of State shall be a traditional chief selected by NPFL and ULIMO in the person of the Honourable Tamba Tailor in accordance with part II, section A (i), of the Akosombo agreement and agreed by the parties.

Consistent with part II, section A (i), of the Akosombo agreement, induction of the Council of State shall take place in the City of Monrovia under the auspices of the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or his designee within fourteen (14) days as of the cease-fire date.

SECTION H

Article 20

Consistent with section H, article 20, of the Akosombo agreement, the parties reaffirm the acceptance of the ECOWAS peace plan, including the Cotonou and Akosombo agreements, as the best framework for peace in Liberia.

All provisions of the Akosombo agreement not herein clarified remain in full force and effect.

DONE AT ACCRA, REPUBLIC OF GHANA, THIS TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF DECEMBER AD 1994

(Signed) Charles G. TAYLOR
Leader
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

(Signed) Lt.-Gen. Alhaji G. V. KROMAH
National Chairman
United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO)

(Signed) Lt.-Gen. J. Hezekiah BOWEN
Chief of Staff
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

Attested to:

(Signed) H.E. Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS
President of the Republic of Ghana and
Current Chairman of ECOWAS

Attachment

Schedule of implementation of the Akosombo Agreement from cease-fire to elections

(28 December 1994-14 November 1995)

		Period												
Serial number	Weeks	Dec. 94	Jan. 95	Feb. 95	Mar. 95	Apr. 95	May 95	Jun. 95	Jul. 95	Aug. 95	Sep. 95	Oct. 95	Nov. 95	Dec. 95
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)
1	2	28-----	------11	Factions inform combatants of cease-fire										
2	3		12------	-------4	Factions disengage from check points/present combat positions to areas under own arrangements									
3	3		12------	-------4	Verification by ECOMOG/UNOMIL/LNTG/warring factions									
4	2		21------	-------7	Reconnaissance mission/build-up of logistics-ECOMOG/UNOMIL/LNTG									
5	10			8-------	--------	------21	Deployment of ECOMOG/UNOMIL to safe havens throughout the country							
6	4			13------	------13	Completion/preparation for new assembly/encampment sites								
7	4				1-------	------30	Combatants in assembly/encampment sites							
8	8					1-------	------30	Disarmament/demobilization						
9	9					1-------	--------	-------7	Resettlement/repatriation					
10		Preparations for elections						8-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	-----11	
11												Election day	-----14	

Notes:

Cease-fire - 2359 hours 28 December 1994 (Midnight 28/29 December 94).

Installation of new Council of State

Election Day - 14 November 1995.

Inauguration of new Government - 1 January 1996.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/8
6 January 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to "The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", I have the honour to convey the text of the Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement, signed on 23 December 1994 (annex I) and the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities, signed on 31 December 1994 (annex II).

I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

95-00383 (E) 060195 070195

/...

Annex I

Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement

The undersigned representatives agree as follows:

1. There shall be a general cease-fire along all lines of confrontation, which will take effect at 1200 hours on 24 December 1994. The general cease-fire shall be for an initial period of seven days and four months and shall be subject to renewal by agreement of the parties.

2. Should any party breach the terms of this agreement, and if such a breach is verified, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) shall report such a breach of the terms of the agreement through the Secretary-General to the Security Council immediately. The parties shall be responsible for reporting breaches to each other and to UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR shall assess allegations of breaches, attempt to resolve them where possible, and make public the results of its assessment, as appropriate.

3. The parties shall enable the passage of UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys as well as teams deployed for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire in accordance with the terms of this agreement and existing procedures. The parties commit themselves to full respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR, humanitarian and related personnel.

4. The parties agree to protect the human rights of those persons residing within territory under their control in accordance with international standards, to include international humanitarian law. All people, regardless of age, sex or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. The human rights situation in all areas shall be subject to international monitoring and observation.

5. The parties agree to the prompt and unconditional release of all detainees, to include prisoners of war, and the release of all available information on missing persons, each to be carried out in its own right. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will elaborate, in conjunction with the parties, a plan of action to implement this portion of the agreement.

6. Negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement for a period of no less than four months shall commence immediately after this agreement takes effect, with the intention of concluding the cessation of hostilities agreement by 1 January 1995. During the negotiations

the Commanders of the parties in conflict will meet under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR to determine the military arrangements for the implementation of a cessation of all combat activities along all lines of confrontation.

23 December 1994

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

(Signed) Radovan KARADŽIĆ

(Signed) Rasim DELIĆ

(Signed) Ratko MLADIĆ

Witnessed by: (Signed) Yasushi AKASHI

(Signed) Bertrand DE LA PRESLE

Annex II

Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities

1. Following the Cease-fire Agreement, signed on 23 December 1994, the parties agree to a complete cessation of hostilities with effect from 1200 hours on 1 January 1995 along all lines of confrontation. This agreement will be in effect for an initial period of four months, subject to renewal under these same conditions by agreement of the parties.

2. The cessation of hostilities will be supervised and monitored by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) through the establishment of joint commissions. A Central Joint Commission shall be established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR, with initial meetings at the Sarajevo Airport, and regional joint commissions shall also be established in permanent session as needed and as determined by the Central Joint Commission.

3. Liaison officers will be exchanged between UNPROFOR and the parties by 15 January 1995 and afterwards where deemed appropriate.

4. Cessation of hostilities will include the following measures:

(a) Separation of forces in conflict to mutually agreed positions and the positioning of UNPROFOR forces for observation and monitoring, to include interpositioning;

(b) The parties agree to refrain from the use of all explosive munitions, and the use of weapons used to fire explosive munitions. In addition, talks will begin immediately on the modalities for the withdrawal and monitoring by UNPROFOR of heavy weapons of 12.7 mm calibre and above.

5. Full freedom of movement with appropriate procedures shall exist for UNPROFOR and other official international agencies, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in order to implement this agreement, to monitor human rights and to deliver humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and evacuations. The parties commit themselves to full respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR and related personnel. UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent any abuse of freedom of movement by its personnel or convoys which might be of military benefit to either party.

6. The parties agree to comply immediately and fully with all existing agreements, including the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 24 April 1993 Srebrenica Agreement, the 8 May 1993 Srebrenica and Žepa Agreement, the 14 August 1993 Mount Igman Demilitarized Zone Agreement, the 9 February 1994 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 17 March 1994 Agreement regarding the use of civilian traffic across Sarajevo Airport, the 23 April 1994 Goražde Agreement and the 14 August 1994 Anti-Sniping Agreement.

7. The parties agree to assist fully in the total restoration of utilities and the establishment of joint economic activities aimed at the normalization of

life in all territories, and in particular in and around the Safe Areas. These activities shall be undertaken on a reciprocal basis.

8. The parties agree to work continuously and simultaneously on processes for the early release of persons detained in relation with the conflict, as well as for the provision and cross-checking of all available information on persons unaccounted for. This work will be undertaken under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in accordance with their standard procedures. The parties commit themselves to commencing the processes by 15 January 1995.

9. The parties agree to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and observation of the withdrawal of all foreign troops. UNPROFOR will perform this specific task on the basis of this agreement with the parties to the conflict and in accordance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and statements.

10. This agreement is to be without prejudice to the final political or territorial solution.

31 December 1994

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

(Signed) Rasim DELIĆ

(Signed) Krešimir ZUBAK

(Signed) Vladimir SOLJIĆ

(Signed) Radovan KARADŽIĆ

(Signed) Ratko MLADIĆ

Witnessed by: (Signed) Yasushi AKASHI

(Signed) Sir Michael ROSE

Statement of Understanding concerning the Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement and the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities

During discussions with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) representatives at Mostar, Mr. Zubak stated that he would sign the Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement (23 December 1994) and the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities (31 December 1994), on the understanding that, under articles 4 and 5 of the Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement (regarding human rights and the release of detainees), and supported by the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities:

(a) Croats and Muslims should not be forcibly conscripted into the Serb armed forces, as combatants or as workers, and that those already conscripted in this way should be unconditionally released; and,

(b) Ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims should cease.

Done at Mostar, on 2 January 1995, by:

(Signed) Krešimir ZUBAK
for the Bosnian Croats

(Signed) Lt.-Gen. Sir Michael ROSE
for UNPROFOR

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GENERAL

S/1995/9
6 January 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

EIGHTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 950 (1994) of 21 October 1994, in which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 13 January 1995. It provides an update on events in Liberia since my last report, of 14 October 1994 (S/1994/1167), including information on the consultations which took place between the Liberian parties under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and on the recommendations of the high-level mission which I recently dispatched to the ECOWAS region.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

A. High-level mission to ECOWAS member States

2. In its resolution 950 (1994), the Security Council welcomed my proposal to send a high-level mission to discuss with States members of ECOWAS the recent deterioration of the situation in Liberia. The mission was to consult with those Governments on how best to revive the peace process and achieve reconciliation among Liberians. The mission was also to explore means of implementing the arms embargo imposed by Security Council resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992, assess the future role of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and examine ways in which the United Nations and the international community could be of assistance in providing financial and technical resources for ECOMOG to carry out its mandate in that country.

3. The mission, which was led by Mr. Lansana Kouyaté, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, visited Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Consultations were held with the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Rawlings of Ghana, with President Lansana Conté of Guinea, with Chairman Valentine Strasser of Sierra Leone, with President Konan Bédié of Côte d'Ivoire, with Chairman David Kpormakpor of Liberia and with the foreign ministers of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine. (This Committee coordinates ECOWAS activities on Liberia and is composed of the foreign ministers of Burkina Faso,

Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone.) Discussions were also held with Liberia's Council of State, diplomatic missions, United Nations organizations and the non-governmental organizations community.

4. Mr. Kouyaté held discussions in Accra with the Liberian faction leaders, who were meeting there at the invitation of President Rawlings. He also had an opportunity to address the ECOWAS ministerial meeting, which was considering a Ghanaian initiative aimed at clarifying the Akosombo Agreement (S/1994/1174, annex). In both cases, he stressed that a sustainable process of reconciliation among Liberians was vital to the success of my efforts to generate support for Liberia. He urged all concerned to help bring about the success of the Ghanaian initiative, as that was a necessary condition for continuation of the international community's support for Liberia. He also pointed out, particularly at the ministerial meeting, that the continuing provision of arms and ammunition to the factions in Liberia was in direct contravention of Security Council resolution 788 (1992) and, indeed, of the resolutions of ECOWAS itself.

5. In all its consultations with States members of ECOWAS, the mission emphasized that an enduring political accommodation among the factions in Liberia would be possible only if it was underpinned by a common policy on the part of the six African countries directly involved with Liberia, namely, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

6. The mission concluded that, notwithstanding the tireless efforts of the Chairman of ECOWAS, the Liberian political and factional leaders were not yet committed to a sustainable peace in their country. Accordingly, the mission submitted the following recommendations for ending the conflict in Liberia:

(a) The Liberian political and factions leaders must be brought to understand that, in the absence of political accommodation and reconciliation, continued support from the international community would not be forthcoming;

(b) ECOWAS member States, particularly the six directly involved with Liberia, should urgently organize an extraordinary meeting of Heads of State to resolve their differences and harmonize their policies on Liberia;

(c) If the above could be accomplished, ECOWAS should be encouraged to consider strengthening ECOMOG and restructuring it in order to achieve a better balance of troops, including contributions from other African countries;

(d) International support, including financial support, logistics and equipment, should be sought to enable ECOMOG to carry out its mandate, particularly with respect to deployment, encampment and disarmament. A planning and logistics team from the Department of Peace-keeping Operations could visit Liberia to offer ECOMOG technical assistance in preparing the necessary proposals;

(e) The future of UNOMIL should depend on the successful implementation of the above steps. Meanwhile, UNOMIL's mandate should be extended for a limited period of three months from 13 January 1995.

B. Consultations between the Liberian parties

7. In my last report (S/1994/1167), I informed the Security Council that the Akosombo Agreement had been a source of significant controversy among those Liberian parties and interest groups which had not taken part in the negotiations. It will be recalled that the Agreement was signed only by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Al Haji Kromah's wing of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and that it was later accepted by General Roosevelt Johnson's wing of ULIMO. Faced with opposition to the Agreement, the Chairman of ECOWAS dispatched delegations to Liberia and to several ECOWAS member States to seek a compromise.

8. In November, the Liberian parties carried out negotiations at Accra for about three weeks. These led to the presentation by Ghana of a compromise proposal, which sought to address the key issues for an agreement: representation and timing of the seating of the new Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG); selection and status of its Chairman; decision-making by the Council; appointment of ministers; establishment of safe havens; cease-fire; and encampment and disarmament.

9. Agreement was reached in several areas. However, the parties failed to reconcile their differences over the composition of the Council of State and the process of selecting its members. The compromise proposal envisaged a five-member Council composed of the following: one member each from NPFL; ULIMO; AFL/Coalition, which consists of ULIMO-Johnson, the NPFL ministers in LNTG who had broken with Charles Taylor and later became the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF); the Liberia National Conference (LNC); and a fifth member, who would become Chairman, and was to have been elected by an electoral college. Failure to reach agreement on this issue resulted in the suspension of consultations on 30 November 1994.

10. While the Liberian parties were holding their negotiations at Accra, the Chairman of ECOWAS convened a meeting of the foreign ministers of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia. The foreign ministers endorsed his initiative. They also agreed that the Ghanaian proposal addressed effectively the concerns which had been expressed about the Akosombo Agreement.

11. In early December, further discussions were held between representatives of the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Liberian factions. During this period, a Ghanaian delegation met with Charles Taylor at his headquarters at Ganta, with the Field Commander of the Kromah forces at Voinjama, and with the Johnson forces at Tubmanburg.

12. The parties returned to Accra on 18 December and, having resolved their key differences, were able to sign an agreement on 21 December. This Agreement (known as the "Accra Agreement") (S/1995/7, annexes I and II) was signed by all the factions currently involved in the Liberian civil war, namely the signatories of the Akosombo Agreement (NPFL, ULIMO-Kromah and AFL) and ULIMO-Johnson, LPC, LDF and CRC-NPFL.

13. The Accra Agreement clarified and expanded the Akosombo Agreement. It stipulated that a cease-fire would come into effect by midnight on 28 December 1994. A new, five-member Council of State would be installed within 14 days composed of one member chosen by each of NPFL, ULIMO, AFL/Coalition and LNC and Mr. Tamba Taylor, a traditional chief chosen by NPLF and ULIMO. Elections would be held on 14 November 1995 and a new Government installed on 1 January 1996.

14. The signatories to the Accra Agreement further agreed to facilitate the establishment of safe havens and buffer zones throughout Liberia. In a separate document (S/1995/7, annex I), those who had not already signed the Akosombo Agreement accepted the terms and conditions of that Agreement as modified.

15. It is too early to assess how far the Liberian factions will adhere to the terms and conditions of the Accra Agreement. However, the cease-fire, which came into effect at midnight on 28 December as stipulated, is still holding. My Special Representative has advised that reports of cease-fire violations have not been verified and that such incidents as have occurred were minor and isolated and did not constitute proper cease-fire violations.

16. The AFL/Coalition members are experiencing some difficulties in agreeing on their nominee for the Council of State, and Ghana is attempting to help them agree on a compromise. No similar difficulties appear to be facing the larger factions.

17. The next step under the Accra Agreement will be the installation of a new Council of State of the LNTG. I have been informed by my Special Representative that President Rawlings will be convening a meeting of all the Liberian factions on 9 January at Accra to finalize measures for this step.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

18. Since my report of 14 October, the military situation in Liberia has remained highly charged and unstable. The hostilities, which resumed in September 1994, have spread to over 80 per cent of the country. Fighting has caused massive population displacement. Humanitarian assistance outside Monrovia has had to be suspended and there have been reports of human rights abuses by all factions. United Nations military observers have had to be withdrawn from most UNOMIL-team sites. The security situation in Monrovia itself has deteriorated significantly.

19. As stated in my last report, the circumstances in Liberia had made it necessary to reduce the number of UNOMIL military observers to approximately 90, compared with the Mission's authorized strength of 368. UNOMIL operations are presently restricted to the areas under ECOMOG control, namely Monrovia, Kakata and Buchanan. They are limited to monitoring the cease-fire, to the extent possible, and to assistance in the delivery of humanitarian support.

20. Fighting between the factions has mainly taken the form of low-level skirmishes accompanied by looting and the destruction of infrastructure. The northern and eastern regions, the control of which has been contested by the

NPFL and Coalition forces, have been the worst affected. ULIMO-Kromah forces had also made incursions into NPFL-held areas in September 1994, although the NPFL has recently regained some lost ground. During the first half of December, NPFL incursions into the Firestone Plantation and Bong Mines were contained by ECOMOG, which has reinforced its presence in those areas. There have been clashes between the two factions of ULIMO in the western region.

21. All the factions have experienced serious problems of command and control. In some instances, ground commanders seem to have wrested the initiative from faction leaders, in particular those who visit their forces infrequently. This has marginalized the influence of the political leadership of some of the factions, especially LPC and ULIMO. This could affect the leaders' ability to ensure the cooperation of their combatants in the implementation of the Accra Agreement. In addition, the provision of humanitarian assistance will continue to suffer unless faction leaders are able to ensure the safe passage of relief supplies.

22. In Monrovia, there have been increasing incidents involving the use of arms. On several occasions, factions have clashed with ECOMOG and with each other in the immediate vicinity of the city. This has affected commercial activity. During the night of 14 December, 48 persons were killed by unknown militia at Duport, which raised tensions along the outer periphery of Monrovia. Citizens have formed vigilance squads in conjunction with ECOMOG to prevent similar incidents from taking place. ECOMOG has also reinforced security measures in the Monrovia area and is investigating the 14 December incident.

23. The inability of ECOMOG to deploy troops at major points along the borders of Liberia, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272, annex), has been a factor in the continuous breach of the arms embargo. Because of insecurity and serious logistic difficulties, ECOMOG is now deployed in less than 15 per cent of the country. Factions continue to acquire arms and ammunition across the borders and from sources within Liberia.

24. As the Security Council is aware, some ECOMOG troop-contributing countries have expressed frustration over the failure of the Liberian leaders to agree on a political solution. The financial hardships experienced by these countries in maintaining their troops in ECOMOG have added to their frustration. In the circumstances, they have indicated their intention to withdraw their troops unless there is progress in the peace process or financial assistance is provided. Some have already drawn down their contribution to ECOMOG.

25. The role of ECOMOG in Liberia continues to be crucial. Should the factions prove themselves committed to the Accra Agreement, ECOMOG forces will have to be strengthened to assist in its implementation. If, however, the factions resume hostilities, a strengthened ECOMOG force would be needed to maintain security throughout the country, though it seems unlikely that in such circumstances the troop-contributing countries would be prepared to provide the forces required.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

26. In my last report, I referred to the extreme hardship of the civilian population throughout rural Liberia as a result of the recent hostilities. The situation has continued to deteriorate. It is now estimated that the number of persons in Liberia requiring humanitarian assistance has risen to 1.8 million. In Monrovia, a constant influx of displaced persons has brought the population to 1.3 million, nearly 3 times the level before the civil war. These developments have significantly increased tension within the community and are further exacerbated by a reduction in commercial activity, rising prices and an increased crime rate.

27. In seeking to respond to humanitarian needs in this volatile environment, national and international relief organizations have to function under even more difficult circumstances than before. The loss of command and control by the leaders of the warring factions and the complete disregard for human suffering by their fighters has limited humanitarian activities to ECOMOG-controlled areas. Increased insecurity has made efforts to expand relief operations into the interior a complex and difficult task. Relief assets and supplies have been looted by factions and humanitarian staff have been displaced. Unable to function effectively in Liberia and given pressing requirements elsewhere, some organizations have redeployed a number of their professional staff to other countries. Liberia's humanitarian tragedy has thus worsened at the precise moment when the capacity of the relief community has been significantly weakened.

28. The donor community, including, in particular, the European Union and the United States Agency for International Development, continue to support the relief community in its efforts to resume delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. However, this will only be possible if the warring factions and their commanders on the ground provide the minimum conditions of safety and security, thereby enabling assistance to reach the hundreds of thousands of Liberians who have received very little for over three months. For its part, UNOMIL has used its limited assets, in particular its modest helicopter capacity and its contacts with the various parties, to advance the cause of humanitarian relief.

29. While mindful of the current operating climate and its constraints, the humanitarian organizations of the United Nations system, in full consultation with non-governmental organizations, have prepared a consolidated inter-agency appeal for Liberia, seeking extrabudgetary resources totalling approximately $64 million to meet emergency, life-saving needs during the first six months of 1995. It is expected that the appeal will be launched in early 1995. In addition, discussions continue with donor representatives resident in Liberia and multilateral financial institutions on possible areas of more long-term support to Liberia, should political reconciliation be achieved.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

30. As indicated in my report on the financing of UNOMIL (A/49/571 and Add.1), which is currently before the General Assembly for its consideration, the cost of maintaining the Observer Mission at its reduced strength is estimated at $1,828,100 gross ($1,745,400 net) per month.

31. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Observer Mission as recommended in paragraph 35 of the present report, the cost of maintaining UNOMIL during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated above.

32. As of 14 December 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Observer Mission amounted to $5.7 million. In order to provide UNOMIL with the necessary cash flow, a total of $2 million has been borrowed from the peace-keeping reserve fund. This loan remains unpaid. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations as of 14 December 1994 was $1,545 million.

33. As of 14 December 1994, contributions received for the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia amounted to $18.1 million. Of this amount, disbursements totalling $16.4 million have been authorized. Since my last report, the Netherlands has contributed $261,584 to the Trust Fund.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

34. With the signing of the Accra Agreement on 21 December 1994 and the implementation of the cease-fire on 28 December, the people of Liberia have been given renewed hope for an end to the war which has afflicted their country since 1990. However, the Liberian parties have signed many peace agreements, only to break them. In the light of this experience, the Liberian people, as well as the international community, have reason to be sceptical about embracing the current peace agreement before the Liberian parties have demonstrated their readiness to honour it.

35. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council extend UNOMIL's mandate for a period of three months. During this period, the Liberian parties will be expected to respect the cease-fire and implement the other relevant aspects of the Accra Agreement, including the installation of the new Council of State. During this period also, my Special Representative will conduct an in-depth assessment of the role the United Nations military observers in Liberia can play in support of the peace process. On the basis of this assessment, he will make recommendations on any adjustments in the strength of UNOMIL which may be required on the assumption that the Liberian leaders provide the necessary evidence of their commitment to peace and their readiness to implement all the provisions of the Accra Agreement.

36. I must remind the Liberian factions that without their full commitment to the peace process, ECOWAS and the international community will not be in a position to continue to assist them in the search for peace in their country.

It is therefore incumbent upon all Liberians, particularly the faction leaders, to ensure that the Accra Agreement and the timetable laid out for its implementation are strictly adhered to.

37. ECOMOG and ECOWAS have played a crucial role in the search for a peaceful solution to the Liberian conflict. I would like to commend the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, for his success in bringing the Liberian factions to sign the agreement of 21 December 1994. ECOMOG will continue to be a critical factor in the implementation of the Agreement and in the maintenance of peace and stability in Liberia, until a freely and fairly elected Government takes office.

38. During his visit to the region, Mr. Kouyaté discussed with ECOWAS member States the assistance they need to maintain their troops in ECOMOG. I have asked my Special Representative to work out, in consultation with ECOMOG, the details of its financial and logistic needs. This will enable me to make an appropriate appeal to Member States to provide the means required.

39. In his report to me, Mr. Kouyaté highlighted the destabilizing consequences of the Liberian conflict on the neighbouring countries. I continue to be concerned that, should the conflict in Liberia continue, the displacement of people and flow of arms over its borders will have serious consequences for stability in the subregion. I therefore call on the States members of ECOWAS to adhere strictly to the arms embargo and renew their commitment to the principles of collective security in ensuring that the Liberian crisis is brought to an end. In this context, it is my hope that a summit of ECOWAS leaders will be convened at the earliest possible date to harmonize their policies on Liberia and promote implementation of the Accra Agreement, including tightening the arms embargo.

40. In the meantime, it is essential to maintain every effort to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the people of Liberia. I urge the donor community to respond generously to the forthcoming inter-agency humanitarian appeal.

41. As I have already informed the Council, I appointed Mr. Anthony Nyakyi (United Republic of Tanzania) as my new Special Representative for Liberia. Mr. Nyakyi took up his duties in Monrovia on 28 December 1994. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my former Special Representative, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, for the dedication and competence he displayed for over two years in his efforts to bring peace to Liberia.

UNOMIL DEPLOYMENT
as of December 1994
Mission Headquarters UNOMIL
Regional Headquarters UNOMIL
Airport Team
Seaport Team
Investigation Team
Cantonment Team
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
CÔTE D' IVOIRE
Atlantic Ocean
Western Region
Northern Region
Central Region
Eastern Region
LOFA
BONG
NIMBA
BOMI
GRAND CAPE MOUNT
GRAND BASSA
RIVER CESS
GRAND GEDEH
SINOE
GRAND KRU
MARYLAND
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Irié
Kailahun
Pendembu
Vahun
Yeala
Zorzor
Nzérékoré
Yekepa
Sanniquellie
Danané
Pujehun
Kongo
Naama Camp
Ganta
Lougatou
Bo
Sulima
Tiene
Kle
Lake Piso
Robertsport
Tubmanburg
Gbarnga
Bong Town
Butlo
Konola
Kakata
Toulépleu
Tapeta
Tobli
Monrovia
CAIS
Towai Town
Cale Town
Zwedru
Dubwe
Tai
Buchanan
Sos Village
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Security Council

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S/1995/10
6 January 1995

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Council, by its resolution 937 (1994) of 21 July 1994, expanded the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to undertake a number of tasks in relation to the 14 May 1994 agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces (S/1994/583, annex I). It also extended UNOMIG's mandate until 13 January 1995. The present report is submitted prior to the expiry of UNOMIG's mandate.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since my previous report of 14 October 1994 (S/1994/1160), a further round of negotiations, which were convened by my Special Envoy for Georgia, with the objective of making progress towards a comprehensive settlement, took place at Geneva from 15 to 18 November 1994. The negotiations revolved mainly around refugee issues and political matters.

3. The very slow pace of return of refugees to Abkhazia dominated the agenda. The Abkhaz side refused to sign a declaration that would have allowed for a speedier return and in larger numbers. It did, however, agree to reduce the review period for consideration of applications from four to two weeks. Regarding political questions, both sides accepted, as a basis for discussion, a draft paper that had been prepared jointly by the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (now redesignated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) and representatives of the Russian Federation. The draft paper outlined possible political and legal components of the future status of Abkhazia within a union State and respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia.

4. On 26 November 1994 the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted a constitution for Abkhazia which declared Abkhazia a "sovereign democratic State". The Supreme Soviet, in a statement issued the same day, declared that "Abkhazia ... is not breaking off the process of negotiations with Georgia, but is prepared to pursue it with a view to the establishment of a union State of two equal

subjects, and it proposes that the process should be invigorated". The Abkhaz leader, Mr. Ardzinba, was "inaugurated" "President of the Republic" on 6 December 1994. The Council's reaction was contained in the presidential statement of 2 December 1994 (S/PRST/1994/78).

5. My Special Envoy had originally intended to invite both sides to hold further talks on the draft political paper at the expert level in Moscow starting on 14 December. However, on 1 December, he was informed that the Georgian side had withdrawn its acceptance of the paper as a basis for discussion. After further information was received on 12 December that the Georgian side would not send any representative to the expert meeting, it was cancelled.

6. I have explored, on a number of occasions, including during my visit to Georgia from 31 October to 2 November, the possibility of my holding a meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Ardzinba in order to move the political process forward. To date, however, these efforts have been to no avail, owing in part to a general preoccupation with events taking place elsewhere in the Caucasus region.

7. In the circumstances, I can only describe the political process as being at a standstill.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. The voluntary repatriation to Abkhazia of refugees and internally displaced persons started in mid-October 1994. Out of an estimated total of 250,000 refugees and displaced persons, some 300 persons have so far returned under the procedures established by the Quadripartite Commission. While the start of the repatriation was an encouraging development, the volume of movement has been very disappointing. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proposed at the quadripartite meeting held on 26 October 1994 that a timetable be set for the repatriation. Meanwhile, reports by both UNHCR and UNOMIG have indicated that a significant number of persons, estimated at several thousands, have repatriated spontaneously.

9. During the Geneva talks held in November, a statement on the question of refugees and displaced persons was issued jointly by the United Nations, the then CSCE and the Russian Federation requesting the parties to take a number of specific steps to speed up the pace of repatriation.

10. Since the end of November, however, formal repatriation has virtually halted. The issue of the timetable was again addressed at the meeting of the Quadripartite Commission held on 24 November, but no progress was achieved. The only point on which the views of the parties converged was that a high-level political decision was required to break the deadlock. UNHCR has made some concrete proposals to the co-signatories of the Geneva statement regarding revitalization of the work of the Quadripartite Commission.

11. Despite isolated incidents, the Abkhaz authorities have made efforts to ensure the security of returnees. However, the security situation in the Gali

region remains extremely precarious and several serious security threats have been reported. These are attributed to actions carried out by uncontrolled groups and formations and it is noteworthy that the statement signed in November explicitly appealed to the parties to prevent such groups from entering the security zone. Sustained efforts are required to create a secure climate conducive to repatriation. Inevitably, humanitarian programmes have been affected by the still unstable security situation. In addition, there continues to be a danger of mines; the mine-awareness education programme has progressed at a slower pace than anticipated.

12. The lack of momentum in repatriation is also a major constraint in addressing the needs of spontaneous returnees and other affected members of the population. In the absence of a clear commitment by the parties to the quadripartite process, the financing of humanitarian programmes is becoming increasingly difficult. The funding situation of UNHCR's programmes is so critical that consideration is being given to whether it is possible to maintain the present staffing level for an operation that appears to be facing stalemate.

13. The repeated delays in the repatriation process impose a heavy additional burden on the rest of Georgia. The health structure in Georgia is deteriorating because of lack of funds for the purchase of medicines and vaccines, and other problems and shortages have led to severe public health emergencies, such as outbreaks of measles, diphtheria and hepatitis and the reappearance of tuberculosis. This exacerbates social tensions in the country and makes the speedy repatriation of persons displaced by the conflict in Abkhazia a matter of considerable urgency.

14. An inter-agency assessment mission to the Caucasus, headed by a representative of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, is being undertaken in mid-January 1995 and will evaluate the needs of Georgia and the other countries in the region for the coming year, for the purposes of preparing the next inter-agency consolidated appeal for the Caucasus (April 1995-March 1996). The current appeal for Georgia, which is aimed at bringing emergency relief to people displaced by the fighting in Abkhazia, and expires in March 1995, has a 52 per cent shortfall in contributions.

15. Council members will recall that the Voluntary Fund mentioned in paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 937 (1994) has been established. On 23 November 1994 I appealed to Member States to contribute to that Fund. No contributions have been received to date.

IV. OPERATIONS OF UNOMIG

16. UNOMIG has been fulfilling its tasks as mandated by the Security Council in resolution 937 (1994). It has operated mainly in the security and restricted weapons zones and in the Kodori valley. It has also monitored the weapons storage sites on both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. Each of the weapons storage sites is guarded by representatives of the respective side.

17. UNOMIG has reached its full authorized strength of 136 military observers. As mentioned in paragraph 11 of my previous report to the Council (S/1994/1160),

the operation has its headquarters in Sukhumi with part of the headquarters staff located in Pitsunda. It has three sector headquarters - at Sukhumi, Gali and Zugdidi - with the largest number of military observers based in Gali. Two semi-static observation posts have been established in the Gali sector at the boundary between the security and restricted weapons zones (see annexed map). The liaison office in Tbilisi is now established.

18. The full deployment of UNOMIG has allowed it to intensify its operations in the security zone. These activities are undertaken in close coordination with the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Priority is given to two areas - the area west of Zugdidi, where most of the spontaneous return of refugees and internally displaced persons takes place, and the area along the Gali Canal. The aim of this intensification is to observe, and if possible prevent, the infiltration of armed personnel into the security zone, thus contributing to the creation of conditions conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. The parties have been informed of the intensification of activities by UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force.

19. Although relatively few armed persons have actually been prevented from entering the security zone, closer monitoring has increased the confidence of the local civilian population, and the incidence of looting seems to have dropped from its previous very high level.

20. The mission has been receiving cooperation from both the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. Apart from a few isolated incidents, which are normally solved quickly, the military observers enjoy the freedom of movement necessary to perform their tasks. The attitude of the local population towards UNOMIG has been generally positive.

21. The exchange of letters with the Government of Georgia on the status of UNOMIG has been completed.

22. The establishment of the UNOMIG liaison office in Tbilisi has contributed to the strengthening of cooperation between UNOMIG and the OSCE office in Tbilisi.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. General

23. The situation in UNOMIG's area of operations has generally been stable but tense. The crime rate in the area continues to be high; sporadic shooting is a daily occurrence, especially in the Gali region, and local authorities in that region have been unable to control banditry. It is the assessment of UNOMIG that no direct threat exists against its personnel but that the security situation demands vigilance.

B. Security and restricted weapons zones

24. The parties continue to comply with the 14 May agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces. All armed forces and heavy military equipment have been withdrawn from the security zone and no heavy military equipment remains in the restricted weapons zone.

25. Attempts to reintroduce military equipment into the zones have occurred. Such attempts are generally made with the justification that the equipment is necessary to support the activities of the police and/or the militia. Equipment has been withdrawn after a protest from UNOMIG and/or the CIS peace-keeping force. Armed groups from both sides have also attempted to infiltrate the security zone. Most of these incidents have been handled on the spot by the CIS peace-keeping force, which has in some instances also disarmed infiltrators, with the assistance on occasion of UNOMIG.

26. Council members will recall the difference of opinion between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities as to the type of personal arms to be allowed in the restricted weapons and security zones; the Abkhaz carry automatic rifles, whereas the Georgian police carry pistols. That difference in level of armament still exists and it is UNOMIG's assessment that it is unlikely to change.

27. Although possession of hand-held weapons in the security zone requires authorization and registration, it is likely that a considerable number of such weapons are still present in the area.

28. Robbery and looting throughout the zones are a regular occurrence. These incidents are especially frequent in the Gali region, where the number of ambushes by unknown assailants has been on the increase. Some of these ambushes have been carried out by persons entering the region from south of the Inguri river. The CIS peace-keeping force, which has night-vision equipment, has informed UNOMIG that some of the infiltrating groups are clearly operating in a military manner. There is no evidence that such activities have the support of the Government of Georgia: in some instances they seem to be carried out locally with the aim of destabilizing the situation and in others they appear to have the character of private vendettas.

C. Kodori valley

29. As described in paragraphs 22 to 24 of my previous report (S/1994/1160), the CIS peace-keeping force carried out an operation called "search and explain" in the Kodori valley between 5 and 13 October 1994. It was monitored by UNOMIG as well as by representatives of the Government of Georgia, the Abkhaz authorities and the Svans (the inhabitants of the valley).

30. The operation confirmed to the Abkhaz authorities that Georgian troops were no longer present in the valley and the Svans were informed of the details of the 14 May agreement. The CIS peace-keeping force also ensured that heavy military equipment was either withdrawn from the valley or destroyed. During

the operation a number of mines and caches of ammunition were found and destroyed.

31. Upon completion of the repair of the main road leading into the valley, the CIS peace-keeping force established two checkpoints, which it manned. They are intended to reassure the Svans that their security will be assured.

32. UNOMIG had continued to patrol regularly in the valley until November of last year, when weather conditions prevented it from doing so. Efforts are continuing to provide UNOMIG with the necessary capabilities to carry out the patrols. The CIS peace-keeping force has maintained two observation posts, in Lata and Azhara, and the above-mentioned two checkpoints. The force has about 100 personnel on both sides of the valley. The Abkhaz side maintains a post with approximately 15 personnel 5 kilometres east of Lata, and the Svans a post to the east of the repaired road.

33. Life in the valley has largely returned to normal. The total population is estimated at 3,500, all living east of the now repaired road. Schools have started again, but classes are not held regularly. Regular meetings between Abkhaz representatives and the Svan leaders are taking place, normally in the area of the repaired road.

34. The relationship on the ground between the Abkhaz and the Svans has improved substantially. However, the Svans are concerned about their future since Abkhaz political leaders still assert their intention to prosecute Svans who fought against Abkhazia. The Svans will resist such a move if it is implemented. They are in possession of many hand-held weapons and there are indications that they may also have heavier weapons.

VI. COOPERATION BETWEEN UNOMIG AND THE CIS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

35. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force has proceeded along the lines described in my report of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818, paras. 14-17). Exchanges of information, mutual assistance and joint patrolling are regularly taking place and the cooperation has continued to be satisfactory.

36. UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force continue to coordinate the execution of their respective mandates. The Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG and the Commander of the CIS peace-keeping force meet once or twice a week to exchange views and information regarding the prevailing situation and coordination of the operation. Their principal subordinates meet almost daily to exchange information and to plan the practical aspects of the cooperation. UNOMIG team sites and patrols have frequent contacts with the CIS peace-keeping force's posts and patrols.

37. The CIS peace-keeping force has been conducting its operations within the framework of implementation of the 14 May agreement. Any variation from its agreed tasks has been made in consultation with the parties.

38. Council members will recall that I have initiated an exchange of letters with the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of CIS to establish an

appropriate arrangement on the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force as regards the 14 May agreement. That exchange has not yet been completed.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

39. As I have reported above, the political process is at a standstill. Moreover, there have been few substantive results since negotiations for a comprehensive settlement began just over a year ago. The core question of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, namely the identification of a political status for Abkhazia acceptable to both sides, remains far from being resolved.

40. Given the intensity and proximity of the crisis in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, it is likely that political efforts to address the Abkhazia issue will remain in suspense for the time being. However, in the medium and longer term, I remain convinced that negotiations between the two sides are the only way that this complex issue can be satisfactorily resolved. The present situation prevents a successful resolution of the humanitarian problems of the refugees and displaced persons. It also fails to provide the basic elements of stability and security that are essential for the eventual return of normalcy to the peoples of the region.

41. My Special Envoy stands ready to continue his mediating role, with the help of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the active participation of OSCE. In addition, I continue to be willing to assist personally by meeting either separately or jointly with the leaders of the two sides in the interests of giving momentum to the negotiation process.

42. The current mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force will end on 15 May 1995 (S/1994/1459). I recommend to the Council that it extend UNOMIG's mandate until that date. I shall in due course submit an addendum to the present report stating the financial implications of this recommendation.



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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

Addendum

1. On 6 January 1995, I received a letter from the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) confirming his agreement to my letter of 4 November 1994 which contained my proposals regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the CIS peace-keeping force as regards the 14 May agreement. Accordingly, the exchange of letters mentioned in paragraph 38 of my report of 6 January 1995 (S/1995/10) has now been completed.

2. I have instructed the Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG to share the contents of the exchange of letters with the Commander of the CIS peace-keeping force so as to implement the appropriate arrangements as described therein.

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Addendum

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

1. By its resolution 49/231 of 23 December 1994, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) at a rate not to exceed $1,720,034 gross ($1,617,034 net) per month for the period from 14 January to 13 July 1995. This authorization is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

2. In my report to the Security Council of 6 January 1995 (S/1995/10), I recommended in paragraph 42 that the mandate of UNOMIG be extended for a further period until 15 May 1995.

3. Should the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 13 January 1995, the monthly cost of maintaining the Mission will be limited to the commitment authority contained in General Assembly resolution 49/231.

4. As at 31 December 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNOMIG amounted to $347,312. Total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations as at that date amounted to $1.2 billion.

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